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A Theory of the Laws of War 
Eric A. Posner1 
 
 
Abstract. The laws of war govern the weapons and tactics that belligerents may use 
against each other. This paper uses a model of conflict to explain and evaluate the 
laws of war. In the model a nation’s propensity to engage in conflict is a positive 
function of the effectiveness of military technology, and a negative function of the 
destructiveness of technology. Accordingly, in theory nations would want to agree 
to laws of war that permit destructive weapons and tactics but limit their 
effectiveness. However, nations with different endowments and resources will 
enjoy differential advantages, and this makes agreement on specific laws of war 
very difficult. The paper discusses empirical implications of the argument, and 
discusses whether the Hague Conventions are consistent with the model. 
 
 The ancient Greeks fought many wars among themselves but also observed rules 
of battle. These rules prohibited summary execution of prisoners, attack on 
noncombatants, the pursuit of defeated opponents beyond a limited duration. and many 
other forms of warfare that are condemned to the present day.2 Josiah Ober argues that 
the Greek rules were intended to limit the violence of war, and he, like many other 
historians, take comfort in what seems like a natural human tendency to limit the brutality 
of war. A war in which prisoners are spared is surely more humane than a war in which 
they are executed. But another interpretation is possible. These “rules” could be 
descriptions of behavioral regularities rather than constraints on self-interested behavior. 
Prisoners are not usually executed but only because they have value as hostages and are 
often ransomed. Armies often spare noncombatants because they pose no immediate 
threat, they can provide supplies, information, and other services, and armies do not wish 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to Jack Goldsmith, Rich Hynes, and Richard 
Posner, and especially to Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, for helpful comments, to The Sarah Scaife 
Foundation Fund and The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Fund for financial support, and to David 
Kitchen for valuable research assistance. 
2 Josiah Ober, Classical Greek Times, in The Laws of War 13 (Michael Howard, et al. eds. 1994). 
 
to give other civilians a reason for resistance. And any army that pursues a defeated 
opponent risks outrunning its supply lines and falling into disorder. Patterns of behavior 
that seem humane are not necessarily signs of humanity. The view shared by Ober and 
others mistakenly assumes that the military objective is always to slaughter as many 
people as possible, when it is more often to acquire territory and secure other resources, 
activities that often are best accomplished by treating civilians and even enemy soldiers 
with restraint. 
 
 The optimistic view about the laws of war is shared by many scholars in the 
international law community. Although their interpretation of events in past wars is, like 
Ober’s, often superficial—the common claim that international law prevented most 
belligerents from using poison gas against combatants during World War II makes an 
unnecessary puzzle of nations’ willingness to violate many other laws during that war—
the pessimistic view that the laws of war have no effect is also too strong. It has trouble 
explaining why states talk as though they recognized laws of war, and in the last century 
made repeated efforts to codify them and expand them in treaties and conventions. The 
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were the first significant official effort to 
spell out the rules of war. These rules included a general prohibition on weapons that 
cause “unnecessary suffering,” as well as several more specific restrictions on the use of 
weapons and tactics. Subsequent conventions have dealt with biological and 
antipersonnel weapons, the treatment of prisoners of war, and the treatment of civilians at 
time of war.3 And even though the laws of war were widely disregarded during World 
War I and World War II, they have been the subject of extensive diplomatic negotiation 
since 1945. 
 
 The optimistic and pessimistic views, as fleshed out in the literature, differ in their 
assumptions about the motivations of states and their interpretations of evidence. The 
pessimists assume that states act in their interest, and their interest is usually that of 
security and power. The optimists assume that while states act in their interest, they also 
internalize the humanitarian norms reflected by international law, and treat them as 
                                                 
3 See Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (1980); Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (1994). 
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partial constraints on behavior. In work with Jack Goldsmith, I have argued that 
international law is equilibrium behavior in which self-interested states are constrained 
only by their expectations about the strategies chosen by other self-interested states.4 We 
agree with the optimists that states can in theory obtain gains through coordination and 
cooperation, but we agree with the pessimists that states do not regard international law 
as an external binding force, and we also tend to agree with the pessimists that the 
evidence suggests that true cooperation is relatively rare. 
 
 In this paper I also argue that the laws of war can, in theory, be explained as self-
enforcing strategies adopted by self-interested states, though again I find the pessimistic 
interpretation of the evidence more compelling than the optimistic interpretation.5 To say 
that the laws could produce joint gains is not to say that they do. My focus is not on 
whether the rules constrain—it is sufficient to point out that states during interwar 
periods either think or hope or pretend that the laws can constrain—but on the content of 
the rules.6 The question is, Why would states think it in their interest to consent to laws of 
war that confine their choices among weapons and tactics? I will argue that the 
conventional wisdom—that the laws of war reflect humanitarian considerations—is 
unhelpful, and that the laws of war, like arms limitations agreements, are best understood 
as devices for limiting states’ investment in military conflict. But I will also point out a 
deep puzzle about these laws. 
                                                 
4 Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi.. L. Rev. 
1113 (1999). 
5 See John B. Hattendorf, Maritime Conflict, and Adam Roberts, Land Warfare, in Laws of War, supra 
note __.  
6 For a theory of compliance with the laws of war, see James Morrow, The Laws of War, Common 
Conjectures, and Legal Systems in International Politics, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2002). He treats the 
laws as efforts by states to identify in advance self-enforcing strategies in a game of attrition. 
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I. The Laws of War: An Overview 
 
 The laws of war can be divided into general principles and specific prohibitions.7 
The necessity principle holds that the amount of suffering caused by a weapon (in the 
form of death, serious injuries, and so forth) should not be more than necessary to 
achieve a legitimate military aim. The discrimination principle, and the related 
proportionality principle, hold that civilians should not be targeted, and collateral damage 
to them and their property should be limited.8 
 
 The principles are most easily understood in their application to specific 
prohibitions. The necessity principle is illustrated by the distinction between dumdum 
bullets, which are proscribed, and explosive shells, which are permitted. Both cause 
severe wounds, compared to those caused by ordinary bullets, but the explosive shells 
also disable or kill more soldiers. For a given level of suffering, the explosive shell 
obtains a larger military objective. To be sure, one might quarrel with both claims, and 
argue that dumdum bullets are more effective than explosives and ordinary bullets when 
the military objective is to stop enemy soldiers without destroying nearby structures or 
civilians, but the basic idea is clear. 
 
 The proportionality principle would likely forbid area bombing of cities during 
World War II, which was intended to kill and demoralize civilians. The recent American 
strategy of bombing targets from high altitudes so that pilots are invulnerable to anti-
aircraft fire provides a more controversial example. It has been argued that the strategy 
produces too many civilian deaths for a given military objective, and that the 
proportionality principle requires American pilots to risk their lives and fly at lower 
altitudes in order to reduce the harm to civilians.9  
                                                 
7 This summary is based on Christopher Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New 
Millennium, in Law of Armed Conflict into the Next Millennium 194-212 (Michael Schmitt & Leslie 
Green eds. 1998). 
8 The first principle says that civilians should not be targeted; the second says that destruction of 
military targets should not cause unnecessary collateral civilian damage. I will treat them as a single 
principle limiting damage to civilians and civilian property. 
9 Amnesty International, “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful Killings?: Violations of the Laws of War 
by NATO During Operation Allied Force (June 2000). 
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  Also interesting, but not squarely following from the principles, is a rule against 
perfidy, which forbids soldiers to wear the uniforms of enemies, call a truce in order to 
lure the enemy into the open where they will be attacked, disguise a warship as a hospital 
ship, and so forth. Deception during war is not prohibited: one can trick the enemy into 
thinking that one’s army is at point A rather than point B. The prohibition extends only to 
deception that involves the manipulation of international law. 
 
 There are many other principles and prohibitions, including a great many 
maritime rules of an analogous nature, and more detailed rules contained in the Geneva 
Conventions and subsequent international court opinions. But those that have been 
mentioned serve to convey the general sense of the laws of war. 
 
II. The Humanitarian View 
 
 The conventional explanation for the laws of war is that they serve humanitarian 
values, but it is hard to find a detailed defense of this position. The necessity and 
discrimination principles are usually identified with the humanitarian premise, as if they 
were logically entailed. Other principles or rules, such as those against perfidy, are said to 
reflect “chivalric values.”10 The prohibition of highly expensive weapons, a goal of some 
of the parties to the Hague Conferences, appears to be based on the goal of making war 
less costly, not necessarily to save lives and property during wars.11 The rules also reflect 
“deep-seated taboos” like the taboo against fire, and “self-interest,” such as the desire to 
preserve a military advantage (like Britain’s navy) against a new technology 
(submarines).12 But this hodgepodge is not satisfactory. There might or might not be a 
deep-seated taboo against fire; fire has been an important weapon for hundreds of years. 
Chivalric values are offended by all kinds of permitted behavior: not just the use of 
                                                 
10 Greenwood, supra note __, at 190; Thomas Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 
Amer. J. Int’l L. 239 (2000). 
11 Id., at 191 
12 Id. 
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deception that does not involve international law, but the use of artillery and other long 
range weapons. There are too many moving parts and ambiguous concepts. 
 
 The deeper puzzle about the humanitarian theory is that limiting the 
destructiveness of weapons and tactics does not necessarily minimize the loss of life and 
destruction of property. The contrary view, which has been asserted time and again, is 
that short-term ruthlessness reduces long-term suffering.13 Massive destruction promises 
to end a war earlier rather than later, and to deter future wars. Nuclear weapons, it is often 
argued, kept the peace during the Cold War.14 
 
 The standard rejoinder to these objections (other than denial of its empirical 
validity) is that the laws of war accept the existence of war, and have the limited role of 
constraining suffering.15 But if the result is more war and more suffering, then the laws 
do not serve a humanitarian purpose; they are merely perverse. 
 
III. A Theory 
 
 A. A Simple Case Involving Equal States 
 
 Imagine two states (i = 1,2) that start with equal resources (ri) and then invest 
them either in productive capital (ei) or military capital (fi).16 Productive capital produces 
goods for domestic consumption; military capital produces appropriative capacity—the 
ability to extract a share of the other state’s resources. Each state knows that the other 
state will divide its resources between production and predation; there is full information. 
                                                 
13 Paul Kennedy and George J. Andreopoulos, The Laws of War: Some Concluding Reflections, in The 
Laws of War 217; Best, Humanity in Warfare, supra note __. 
14 Nuclear weapons have not been subject to specific prohibitions but they potentially run afoul of the 
proportionality principle, depending on their use. Compare Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226. 
15 Meron, supra note __. 
16 I rely on a simplified version of Hirshleifer’s conflict model here and throughout, and the reader 
should consult his discussion for assumptions, limitations, and so forth. Jack Hirshleifer, The Paradox of 
Power, in The Dark Side of the Force (2001). I do not discuss production technology and thus assume that 
in his model the production technology variable s = 1. For a related model, see Herschel Grossman and 
Minseong Kim, Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 
1275 (1995). 
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 The efficiency with which resources are converted into productive or military 
capital depends on the productive and military technologies. Keeping things simple, we 
will assume a simple productive technology where one unit of production produces one 
unit of income. Think of the two states jointly producing an income equal to the sum of 
their respective investments in productive capital (y = e1 + e2). This joint income is, in 
effect, a common pool from which each state extracts a share through its investment in 
military capital. Each unit of investment in military capital increases the investing state’s 
share of the joint income, holding constant the other state’s investment. If each state 
invests an equal amount, each obtains half of the joint income; if one state invests more 
than the other, then the first state’s share is larger than one half. The military technology, 
m > 0, is a variable that changes as a result of technological and strategic innovation: the 
more efficient the military technology, the larger a share of the joint income will be 
obtained by a state that invests one additional unit in military capital, holding constant the 
other state’s investment in military capital.17 
 
 For each state, the optimal outcome occurs if both invest all their resources in 
production and none in predation. They produce the maximum output and divide it 
evenly.18 The problem is that each state has an incentive to invest in predation as well. If 
state j invests 0 in its military, then state i can obtain all of the joint income by investing a 
small amount in its military. Because state j has the same incentive, both states will invest 
a positive amount in their militaries. Further, because each state expects the other to 
engage in some predation, the first state does not expect to obtain the full marginal dollar 
of its investment in productive capital; and this creates an additional incentive to move 
resources from production to predation. On the other hand, neither state will invest all of 
its resources in military capital, for then at the margin it will obtain relatively little from 
the other state while foregoing its own opportunity to produce goods and keep a share of 
them. 
 
                                                 
17 A state’s share pi = fim / (f1m + f2m). Thus, each state’s utility function is piy, subject to ri = ei + fi. 
18 For now, I assume that each state wants to maximize consumption; a common assumption among 
realists is that states care about relative position. This assumption does affect the discussion here; I will 
discuss it below when it matters. 
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 In equilibrium each state will invest equal, positive amounts in both military and 
productive capital. What is more interesting, for our purposes, is that they will invest 
more in military capital as the military technology becomes more efficient (holding 
constant productive efficiency). The reason is that with greater efficiency, the predatory 
returns generated by an additional dollar invested in military capital will be greater than 
the share of productive returns generated by an additional dollar invested in productive 
capacity. But because both states invest more in predation, they become jointly worse off. 
Thus, the prisoner’s dilemma-like logic of the game forces the states to impose greater 
joint costs on each other as military technology becomes more efficient. 
 
 The states will be better off if they can jointly limit (1) investment in military 
capital, or (2) the efficiency of military technology. The first goal is generally reflected in 
arms limitation agreements, and is not of concern here. The second goal suggests a 
hypothesis for the laws of war: that they are designed to limit the efficiency of military 
technology. 
 
 This hypothesis sheds light both on the general standards and specific rules. The 
necessity principle, by requiring states to use weapons and tactics that do not cause too 
much harm given a military objective, forces the state to use less powerful or destructive 
weapons. By reducing the options available to commanders, the principle reduces the 
capacity of a unit of military investment to inflict harm on the enemy. The same is true 
for the discrimination principle, which requires a military force to take losses rather than 
inflict too much harm on civilians and civilian property. The discrimination principle thus 
increases the cost of achieving a given objective, that is, increasing one’s share of the 
joint income. 
 
 Rules prohibiting poison gas, the execution of prisoners, the laying of untethered 
mines at sea, and many other activities exhibit a similar logic. Poison gas can be cheap 
and effective; prisoners are costs when conditions prevent their use as hostages or 
8 
workers;19 untethered mines are cheaper than tethered mines; and so forth. Also 
consistent with the hypothesis are repeated but usually unsuccessful efforts to restrict 
new, highly effective weapons—the crossbow, submarines, nuclear devices. 
 
 The rules against perfidy can also be understood from this perspective. Perfidy—
for example, displaying the white flag but then firing on enemy forces as they 
approach—is a highly effective tactic, in the sense that it enables a weaker force to inflict 
losses on a stronger force by luring the latter into the open. Of course, once one side uses 
this tactic, the other side will not trust it, but we must assume that the first side takes the 
costs into account. The rules against perfidy removes an option that is sometimes 
effective, thus driving up the cost of military operations. 
 
 The laws relating to neutrality are designed to make clear the ways that 
belligerents will treat neutrals. Belligerents generally want expansive rights—they want 
to be able to stop neutral ships and search for, and seize, materials being shipped to the 
enemy; and they want to blockade enemy ports. Although belligerents also fear that if 
they treat neutrals too roughly, these states will enter the war on the other side, they will 
balance this cost against the benefit. If laws of neutrality are constraining, then they again 
take away an effective weapon from the hands of the belligerent. (It is conceivable that 
strong neutral rights should be counted as the effective weapon; for example, if enemies 
ship spies and saboteurs via neutral vessels. But the history of the laws of war suggest 
otherwise: that being able to stop, block, or sink neutral ships was an important freedom 
for belligerents.) 
 
 The main barrier to empirical verification of the model is the difficulty 
distinguishing between an efficient technology and an inefficient technology. There is 
much debate, for example, about whether poison gas is efficient or inefficient; and 
apparently efficient technologies like laser-guided bombing are not efficient if they are 
too costly. Still, the “technology limitation” hypothesis has enough support to be 
                                                 
19 On which, see James D. Morrow, The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties, 55 
Inter’l Org. 971 (2001); Posner, Comment, supra note __. 
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considered a legitimate rival to the ill-defined humanitarian view. It implies that laws of 
war will be directed foremost at the most efficient weapons (that is, with the highest ratio 
of military effectiveness to cost, and thus not necessarily the most expensive weapons). It 
also implies that states would ban all weapons if they could; but we will see why they do 
not go that far in the next two sections. 
 
 B. Unequal States 
 
 Suppose now that state i starts with more resources than state j does. Some of the 
basic results of the original analysis continue to hold: each state will invest some amount 
in military capital and as a result neither is as well off as it would be if both invested 
solely in productive capital. However, with unequal resources there is a twist. 
 
 Suppose that the military technology is below some threshold m*. Despite its 
greater wealth, state i will invest the same amount in military capital that state j invests, 
and thus more in productive technology. The reason is that state j, given its limited 
resources, will not produce much income; thus state i gains little from investing in 
predation, and instead will invest more in production. State j thus has all the more to gain 
from predation—it gets a share of the income disproportionately produced by state i. 
State j will gain relative to state i: in the extreme case, they could end up with the same 
share of the joint income. Hirshleifer calls this phenomenon the “paradox of power”: a 
weaker state can gain at a stronger state’s expense.20 
 
 This result does not hold for sufficiently high m and for sufficiently great 
inequality, however. Above a certain m*, and with sufficient inequality, state i will be 
able to invest much more in military capital than state j can. State j’s resources put a 
ceiling on the amount it can invest in military capital; once production is down to 0, state 
j can allocate no more resources to the military. But a sufficiently large state i can devote 
much more to the military, and thus maintain its advantage against j or do better. An 
illustration might be the American defeat by Vietnam and victory over Iraq. In the 
                                                 
20 Hirshleifer, supra note __, at 52. 
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comparatively low-technology Vietnam war, Vietnam’s lack of productive opportunities 
made its opportunity cost of military investment very low.21 As for Iraq, even if it had put 
all its resources into military investment, it would have been unable to resist superior 
American technology and training. 
 
 The result adds a dimension to the earlier model. There is a long history of using 
international law against small predatory states: from the Berber pirates to the current 
exporters of terrorism. Efforts to ban the use of chemical and biological weapons, and the 
spread of nuclear weapons, reflect this logic, as does (controversially) recent efforts to 
ban antipersonnel mines. A small state with powerful weapons can extract tribute, 
concessions, and other benefits from a much wealthier state, and wealthier states would 
like to respond, even in concert, by creating international law that restricts the weapons 
and tactics that favor the small states.22 The rules requiring humane treatment of POWs, 
and permitting trickery but not torture to extract information from them, while to all 
appearances humane, likely benefits wealthier states that have the resources to hold 
POWs in decent conditions, transport them to safe locations, and conduct lengthy 
interrogations. But if we can understand why large states would create international law 
banning these weapons and tactics, we should not be surprised that they have trouble 
enforcing it. Large states that suffer less from small state extortion have little reason to 
aid large states that suffer more from it, and indeed refraining from rendering such 
assistance will produce relative gains in a security competition. 
 
 The model therefore suggests that the small states will not necessarily consent to 
the laws of war. When North Vietnam objected to a proposed law against cluster bombs 
during the Lucerne Conference of 1974, a delegate explained that “a weapon used by the 
imperialist is an imperialist weapon.... In the hands of a liberation fighter, it is a sacred 
tool.”23 Small states seek to outlaw only those weapons and tactics that rich states alone 
can afford. Rich states will support bans on cheap and effective weapons, and also on 
                                                 
21 One must be careful about fitting the model to the facts. The joint income includes something like 
control over the economic and political decisions of Vietnam and Iraq. 
22 Also known as the “weapons of the weak.” See Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: 
Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52 Inter’l Org. 613, 641 (1998). 
23 Eric Prokosch, The Technology of Killing 155 (1995). 
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more expensive ones to the extent that they are more concerned about their absolute level 
of production than about the relative standing of poorer states. Multilateral consensus will 
be difficult to achieve, and peace conferences that begin with high hopes will often 
produce vague principles or rules with large loopholes—a recurrent complaint about the 
Hague and Geneva conventions. 
 
 C. Destructive Weapons 
 
 One can make a useful distinction between effective weapons and destructive 
weapons.24 For a given level of military investment an effective weapon increases the 
state’s share of joint income more than a less effective weapon. By contrast, holding 
constant its effectiveness, a destructive weapon reduces the size of the joint income more 
than a less destructive weapon. In the prior sections, we assumed that military capital had 
zero destructiveness: the loss of income came indirectly through the investment in 
military capital rather than productive capital. With positive destructiveness, a weapon 
reduces the size of the joint income independently of its effect on parties’ incentives to 
allocate resources between the two types of capital. 
 
 The destructiveness of weapons appears to be an important theme of the laws of 
war. Illustrations include limitations on destruction to civilians and civilian structures, on 
the mistreatment of POWs, on weapons that cause devastating wounds, on mines and 
other weapons whose dangerousness persists after the conflict ends, and on weapons that 
cause significant environmental harm. The objectionable feature of these practices is, one 
might argue, not the efficiency of the technology but the extent to which the weapons 
harm productive capital, defined broadly to include the human capital of civilians and of 
soldiers after they are demobilized. 
 
 One might therefore believe that the laws of wars are designed to limit the 
destructiveness of war, and in doing so, to increase production and reduce investment in 
                                                 
24 See Grossman and Kim, supra note __. Hirshman’s model does not make this distinction, and I use a 
slightly modified version of it in this section. 
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military capital. But the truth is more complex. It is possible that limits on the 
destructiveness of weapons make states worse off, not better. 
 
 To see why, one must understand that the destructiveness of a weapon has a good 
as well as a bad side: states are less likely to go to war against states that have destructive 
weapons, even if all states have the same weapons. Assume that each of two states has 
the same resources. Imagine that the existing military capacity of a state can be measured 
by a variable v, where a high v means that a given investment in military capacity results 
in a relatively large reduction in the joint surplus available to both states. If v = 0, as in 
our examples prior to this section, then each state will invest a given amount in military 
technology. For v > 0, each state will reduce its investment in military technology. The 
reason is that while a given amount of military activity will have the same distributional 
effects as before, it will also reduce the size of the joint income that will be divided. With 
a lower marginal benefit from military investment, states will invest fewer resources in 
military capital. In equilibrium, there will continue to be some military investment, but 
much less, and the joint income will be higher than it would be if v were equal to 0. If a 
state can win a war only by destroying the enemy’s cities and factories—and in the 
process will lose its own cities and factories as well—then the fruits of victory are not 
particularly attractive, and neither is conflict. 
 
 The argument is not as paradoxical as it sounds: many people believe that the 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons explains why there was no serious military conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and this was one 
reason why the I.C.J. did not declare them illegal.25 In addition, during World War II 
commanders frequently used a similar argument to justify the destruction of cities and 
civilians through massive aerial bombardment. The more ruthless we are today, the more 
likely they will surrender tomorrow rather than a year from now. 
 
 But the argument cannot be a full explanation for the laws of war: the laws of war 
do not forbid less destructive weapons, as the argument implies that they should. 
                                                 
25 See supra note __. 
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According to the model, the laws of war should forbid non-destructive weapons, and 
should permit destructive weapons. However, the analysis of destructiveness suggests an 
important negative conclusion: that states will be reluctant to ban efficient weapons that 
are also destructive. 
 
 Let us say a few words about destructiveness when states have unequal 
endowments. Recall that poor states gain more from highly effective weapons than 
wealthy states do, at least up to some threshold of effectiveness. This gives wealthy states 
a reason for favoring laws that limit the effectiveness of weapons. One might think that a 
similar logic is at work for destructiveness. But there are many offsetting effects. An 
increasingly destructive weapon makes conflict less likely, but as we have seen, conflict 
can (but does not always) favor poorer states. On the other hand, the destruction itself is a 
deadweight cost and can reduce joint income to the point where the poorer state is made 
worse off. And of course much depends on the extent of the inequality of resources. So it 
is hazardous to judge the impact of destructiveness on enthusiasm for international law 
when states have unequal resources. 
 
 D. Summary 
 
 States have an interest in agreeing to binding (if possible) laws of war that limit 
the effectiveness of military weapons; but the zone of agreement shrinks as one takes 
account of (1) the inequality of wealth among states; (2) the value of effective but 
destructive weapons for averting war. In the next section, we discuss further reasons why 
agreement on the laws of war is difficult. 
 
V. Complications 
 
 A. Technological and Other Strategic Asymmetries 
 
 A significant barrier to agreement on the laws of war is the asymmetry of the 
positions of states. We have already discussed asymmetry of resources. Another 
14 
asymmetry is technological. Russia proposed the Hague Peace Conferences in the hope 
of restricting a powerful type of field gun recently developed by Austria-Hungary. 
Austria-Hungary naturally opposed Russia’s design and no such law was created. 
Another asymmetry is strategic. Britain sought restrictions on submarines because it 
feared that they would threaten Britain’s dominant navy. States with weaker navies 
opposed Britain’s position.26 Opponents of the recent treaty that bans mines point out that 
many signatories have no need for mines; for other states, mines keep the peace between 
them and belligerent neighbors. When a facially neutral law of war has distributional 
effects because of the asymmetric positions of states, agreement will be difficult unless 
there are side payments or compromises. But because of the great heterogeneity among 
states—and particularly in their technological capacities and their strategic positions—it 
will be very rare for all states to benefit from a significant limitation on weapons or 
tactics; and if states care about their relative position, vanishingly rare. Asymmetry of 
position is probably the most important factor limiting the laws of war, forcing peace 
conference delegates to produce vague standards rather than crisp rules.27 
 
 B. Verifiability 
 
 Another significant barrier to agreement is the problem of verifiability. Morrow 
discusses an incident during World War II, when the Luftwaffe bombed an American 
ship that carried chemical weapons.28 The resulting chemical cloud might have been seen 
as a deliberate use of chemical weapons, and a violation of the law of war, justifying 
retaliation in kind. If states jointly benefit from the prohibition of one weapon or tactic, 
but not from the prohibition of a closely related weapon or tactic, then the viability of a 
law against the first depends on whether it can be distinguished from the second. 
 
                                                 
26 See Legro, supra note __, at 36. France during the Napoleonic Wars also attempted to use 
international law to constrain Britain’s dominance at sea; see Hattendorf, supra note __, at 107. There have 
been similar conflicts between nations that depend on maritime commerce, and their opponents; see 
Howard S. Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea (1992). 
27 International criminal courts and international war crimes legislation also fit within the analysis: the 
ICCJ is best understood as an effort to increase the United State’s cost of projecting military power. See 
Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court (unpublished manuscript, 2002). 
28 Morrow, supra note __, at __. 
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 C. Multistate Agreements and Wars 
 
 Wars often involve more than two powers. An increase in the number of states is 
likely to result in an increase in the amount of military investment, and a decrease in the 
amount of productive investment. The logic is the same as that for the Cournot model of 
oligopoly: as the number of firms increases, cooperation becomes more difficult, and the 
cooperative surplus declines. The laws of war should be either weaker and more limited, 
or broken more frequently, as the number of states increases. 
 
 The modern laws of war emerged from multilateral conferences, and have many 
signatories. Morrow argues that many states agree to laws in advance of war, rather than 
a few belligerents agreeing to laws at the start of a war, because in the prewar period a 
veil of ignorance facilitates agreement by masking the distributional effects of the laws.29 
The problem with this view is that the multilateral treaty must be self-enforcing; and if 
earlier agreement is disadvantageous to one state at the start of the war, the state will not 
obey the treaty. In addition, states do send each other messages during wars, in which 
they abjure first use of a weapon like poison gas but threaten to retaliate in case of use by 
the enemy. The simplest explanation for multilateral treaties is that every state, or nearly 
every state, faces some of the same basic strategic interactions in any war, and so there 
are gains from multilateral negotiations rather than numerous bilateral negotiations. But 
one conjectures that these treaties have more influence on subsequent two-state wars than 
on multistate free-for-alls, where strategies of reciprocation are less likely to succeed. 
 
 D. Offense and Defense 
 
 There is a difference between offensive technology and defensive technology. It is 
said that the machine gun was a decisive defensive weapon at the time, and the tank was 
a decisive offensive weapon. One might conjecture that the laws of war would be 
designed to discourage offensive technology and encourage defensive technology. 
 
                                                 
29 Morrow, supra note __, at __. 
16 
 The problem with this argument, however, is that offensive and defensive 
technologies should have similar effects on the depletion of joint income. A high 
offensive technology encourages each state to invest more in conflict: one dollar on 
offense now yields a higher share holding the other side’s strategy constant. But the same 
argument applies to defensive technology. With highly effective defensive technology, 
each state will invest more in defense, thus diverting resources from productive uses. The 
logic is symmetrical.30 
 
 E. Ineffective Weapons 
 
 It is sometimes suggested that laws of war prevent states from using ineffective 
weapons, rather than effective weapons.31 The laws against use of poison gas might have 
succeeded because poison gas was an ineffective weapon. Humane treatment of POWs 
might be a useful strategy for encouraging surrender. These arguments might be true, but 
it is hard to understand why states would bother to outlaw practices that have no military 
value. A state would unilaterally refrain from those practices and hope that the enemy is 
foolish enough to engage in them. There is no law against the bow and arrow; why 
should there be a law against poison gas that blows back onto friendly troops? It might be 
the case that these weapons have a very small military value, and so states comply with 
international law in order to enhance their reputations for being good international 
citizens; but if the cost of refraining from use is so small, the reputational gain should be 
minimal. The better interpretation is that states ban weapons and tactics that states 
believe, or fear, will be highly effective, and indeed that was their attitude about poison 
gas prior to World War II.32 
 
                                                 
30 Grossman’s model distinguishes offense and defense, and what for Hirshman is the “conflict 
technology” is for Grossman the advantage of offense over defense. But Grossman’s model does not shed 
additional light on the laws of war. 
31 Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of International Law: Comments on the Conference, J. Legal. 
Stud. (forthcoming 2002); this is also an implicit theme in Best, supra note __; for example, where he 
argues that area bombing during World War II was illegal because it was both inhumane and less effective 
than precision bombing. Id., p. 303. 
32 See Legro, supra note __, at 158-59 (interwar military opinion held that gas had great military 
value). 
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 VI. Empirical Analysis 
 
 The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 collectively produced 23 
conventions, declarations, and final acts. Forty-six states signed, ratified, or adhered to 
some or all of the seven 1899 documents by 1907. Forty-five states signed, ratified, or 
adhered to some or all of the sixteen 1907 documents by 1914. I analyzed these data 
statistically, focusing on the 1907 documents because there was greater variation in the 
states’ responses. 
 
 The dependent variable was the number of documents which a state signed, 
ratified, or adhered to, minus the number of reservations. For the 1907 conference, the 
dependent variable could range from 0 to 16; in fact, the range was from 7 to 16. The 
dependent variable is thus a crude measure of a state’s enthusiasm for the 1907 
documents.33 Independent variables are various economic, political, and demographic 
variables, as described below. 
 
 Let me begin with the humanitarian view. Because no one has provided a theory 
of humanitarianism, it is hard to derive a testable hypothesis. But one possibility is that 
democracies are more like to support laws of war than non-democracies are. To test this 
hypothesis, I use an index from 0 to 10 developed by political scientists, with a higher 
number representing more democratic institutions. 
 
 The most concrete result of the conflict model is a prediction that states will 
support laws of war that limit effectiveness but not laws that limit destructiveness. But 
although the distinction is conceptually clear—a neutron bomb is less destructive than 
conventional explosives of equal magnitude, but just as effective—I have not found data 
that reflect this distinction. So instead I focus on some subsidiary, and more ambiguous, 
hypotheses. 
                                                 
33 Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Reports to the Hague Conferences of 
1899 and 1907, at 175-77, 898-901 (1917). 
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  First, I hypothesize that militarily weaker states will more strongly support the 
laws of war when they involve expensive new technologies, as was the case with the 
Hague Conference, which can be traced to the emergence of frightening and expensive 
new weapons from the industrial revolution. Second, states that have recently been in 
wars will more strongly support laws of war, because they will have better information 
about the effectiveness of weapons. Third, economically powerful states will more 
strongly support the laws of war because they gain more from production than from 
military predation. Variable definitions and sources, and summary statistics are in the 
appendix, and the results, under alternative specifications, are in Table 1. (I could not test 
all the hypotheses in a single regression because of the low number of observations. 
Instead, I ran alternative specifications and here I report only five of them. In other 
regressions I obtained similar results albeit not always significant, and the reported 
regressions represent the stronger end.) 
 
Table 1 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 .11 (1.0) .11 (1.1) 0.07 (0.7)  
–.04 (–1.7) –.02 (–1.3) –.03 (–2.5)  –.01 (–.9) 
.07 (0.08)    –.02 (–.02) 
–.68 (–2.3) –.36 (–1.7)  –.5 (–2.8) –.41 (–1.8) 
.0002 (1.9)     
25 40 40 41 41 
0.27 0.14 0.1 0.13 0.14 
0.033 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 
 
Note: dependent variable is number of 1907 conventions, declarations, etc., to which state 
agreed, minus reservations; population is logged; military expenditures is in pounds (not 
1000s of pounds); in bold if statistically significant at 0.1 level or below. 
 
 The humanitarian hypothesis is not supported by the democracy variable. As for 
the conflict hypotheses, the military variable is consistent (but not robustly) with the 
weak state hypothesis; the war variable provides no support for the learning hypothesis; 
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and the population variable (robustly) contradicts the economic power hypothesis. The 
ships variable might reflect economic power, and if reliable, might be a better proxy for 
economic power (reliable GDP figures are not available), in which case the third 
hypothesis gains some support; but the ships variable will also be biased against 
landlocked nations. 
 
 I do not want to make much of either the negative or positive results. One can 
think of lots of reasons for not trusting the data (including the low number of 
observations, the unreliability of historical data, and the high degree of multicollinearity). 
But further research would be illuminating, and a natural place to look would be the 
Geneva Conventions, and in particular the length of time before a state ratified them, and 
the number of reservations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 One cannot say with confidence that the laws of war constrain the behavior of 
states, but one can say that states see an advantage in entering treaties and conventions 
regarding the laws of war. This might be public relations, as is sometimes argued, but it is 
just as likely that states perceive a more concrete benefit if mutual compliance turns out 
to be possible and no harm done if mutual compliance does not occur. The benefit, 
should mutual compliance occur, is greater production and consumption for civilians than 
would occur if military investment were unconstrained. In this way, the laws of war (jus 
in bello) are consistent with other laws and agreements about war. Laws of war, and arms 
control agreements and limitations on the conditions under which war can be wage (jus 
ad bello), work together to reduce the total amount of resources devoted to predatory 
activities. The puzzle for the humanitarian theory—that humanitarian laws of war might 
increase suffering by encouraging war—is thus avoided. 
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Appendix34 
 
A. Two Equal States. 
 
 There are two states (i = 1, 2) with equal resources, r (r = r1 = r2). Each divides ri 
among productive effort, ei, and fighting effort, fi. Thus: ri = ei + fi. They produce joint 
income of y, and we will assume y = e1 + e2. Each state’s share of the income is a 
function of the amount invested in effort: pi = fim / (fim + fjm), where j ≠ i. Thus, each state 
obtains income of yi = piy. 
 
 Each state maximizes its share of the income given the other state’s strategy of 
maximizing its own share. The reaction curves (except for corner solutions) are: 
 
fi / fjm = m(e1 + e2) / (f1m + f2m) 
 
 It follows that: f1 = f2 = me1 = me2 = r – me1. It is clear that as m increases, the 
share of income devoted to fighting increases, the share devoted to productive effort 
declines, and income declines. 
 
 Let ri = 100. (Thus joint resources are 200). If m = 1, then each state devotes 50 to 
fighting and 50 to production. Income is thus 100, and each state ends up with 50. 
Conflict dissipates 100. 
 
 Now let m = 2. Then each state devotes twice as much to fighting as to 
production. Given initial resources of 100, each states devotes 67 to fighting and 33 to 
production. Income is thus 66, and each state ends up with 33. Conflict dissipates 134. 
 
 The states would be jointly better off if they could agree to limit m (or f). 
Technically, limiting m means preventing either side from improving weapons and tactics 
                                                 
34 Sections A and B are based on simplified versions of the model in Hirshleifer, supra note __; section 
C contains a modified version of that model. 
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in such a way that would increase its share of the income if the other side did not also 
improve weapons and tactics. 
 
B. Two Unequal States 
 
 Now let r1 > r2. Hirshleifer shows that under certain conditions, the poorer state 
can obtain a (relative) advantage from conflict with a richer state. Formally, y1 / y2 < r1 / 
r2. Here is his numerical example: 
 
 Let (r1, r2) = (200, 100), and m = 1. From the reaction curves, (f1, f2) = (75, 75), 
(e1, e2) = (125, 25), and (y1, y2) = 75, 75. Thus, the states go from a relationship of 
inequality to a relationship of equality.35 
 
 However, at a sufficiently high m the original relationship of inequality will be 
sustained or made more extreme. Consider, for example, the case where m = 3. If there 
were an interior solution, state 2 would need to invest more than 100 in f2; with the 
resource ceiling state 2 will invest 100 only. State 1’s best response is too choose f1 = 
113. Thus: (e1, e2) = (89, 0), and (y1, y2) = (49, 40). Here, the rich state retains a relative 
advantage, although not as high as when it began. But as m increases, the rich state will 
obtain an increasingly large portion of the initial income, and eventually will improve its 
relative position. Thus, if military technology is relatively low, and resources are not too 
unequal, rich states will seek to limit military technology, and poor states will not; if 
military technology is relatively high, and resources are sufficiently unequal, poor states 
will seek to limit military technology, and rich states will not. 
 
C. Destructiveness 
 
 We can add a variable v, for destructiveness, and alter Hirshleifer’s model in the 
following way. For state 1 (and similarly for state 2), let: 
 
                                                 
35 This is Hirshleifer’s example, p. 53. 
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The destructiveness variable, v ≥ 1. If v = 1, then the model is the same as Hirshleifer’s 
(with m = 1), which assumes no destructiveness. For a higher v, the surplus declines in 
proportion to the amount invested in military capital. 
 
Using constrained optimization, the reaction curve for state 1 (and similarly for 
state 2) is:  
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One can see that when v = 1, Hirshleifer’s reaction curves obtain. It is also clear that total 
productive investment (that is, joint income) is increasing in v, that is, with 
destructiveness. For the equal resources case, ei = fvi. 
 
D. Summary Statistics 
 
The dependent variable is the number of conventions, declarations, or acts to 
which a state consented, minus the number of reservations. The statistics are divided into 
a table for the “enthusiastic states” (dependent variable > 13), and the “less enthusiastic 
states.”36 
 
                                                 
36 Democracy variable from the Polity II dataset: ftp://isere.colorado.edu/pub/datasets/p4/p4vksg.asc. 
Wars since 1870 are from Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms 82-99 (1982). The Great 
Powers (Italy, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States) are taken from 
Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System 48 (1983). All other data are from the Correlates of 
War Project at the University of Michigan: http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/dataset.html. The baseline was 
1900, though not all data were available for that date; if not data within ten years were used. 
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yes – res > 13 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dependent 19 15 0.666667 14 16 
democracy (0–10) 19 2.947368 2.676517 0 10 
population (1000s) 21 7203.952 11506.23 417 46798 
urban population 21 538.5238 931.5033 0 3175 
military expenditures (1000s of £’s) 20 2468.1 4502.113 35 16242 
war in last 30 yrs (yes=1) 21 0.428571 0.507093 0 1 
merchant ships 12 2504.417 4037.851 1 12639 
  
 
yes – res < 14 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dependent 26 11.5 1.581139 7 13 
democracy (0–10) 25 3.28 3.576777 0 10 
population (1000s) 24 38234 88454.73 240 425577 
urban population 23 2560.174 4286.775 0 14207 
military expenditures (1000s of £’s) 23 14591.22 27494.24 87 119587 
war in last 30 yrs (yes=1) 26 0.461539 0.508391 0 1 
merchant ships 15 4895.4 7896.372 1 23333 
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